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THEORIES OF NAVAL BLOCKADES AND THEIR  
APPLICATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Adam Biggs, Dan Xu, Joshua Roaf, and Tatana Olson
 The naval blockade is a classic strategy for gaining sea control or imposing sea denial. It harks back to the age of sail, when seafaring strategy and tactics 
inherently were dependent on the weather.1 But whereas once winds could help 
rout the mightiest fleet in the world (as partly explains the defeat of the Spanish 
Armada in 1588), modern naval forces have different capabilities and modern 
naval operations have different limitations.2 Even so, the naval blockade remains 
in use as a strategy today, as was demonstrated during recent unrest in the Middle 
East.3 Technological advancements in weapon systems, platforms, and commu-
nications, however, raise questions about the continuing relevance of blockade 
strategies and tactics that were developed during previous eras of naval warfare. 
If modern navies are using a centuries-old strategy, to what extent do the old 
rules still apply?
This article will address the theory and practice of naval blockades, with a 
specific emphasis on how they apply (or do not) in the twenty-first century. The 
discussion will begin by addressing the general legality of these actions, as they 
largely are governed by international law. Legal issues also have significant implica-
tions regarding terminology (e.g., whether an action constitutes a quarantine or a 
blockade could become the topic of significant legal analysis), so the relevant terms 
will be addressed first, to avoid confusion arising from labeling or wording.4 The 
discussion then will address the classic models of naval blockades, the most influ-
ential of which will be deemed the proximity model. Theories of naval blockades 
will be evaluated in historical context against the various claims made for different 
blockade models.5 Next, the discussion will compare the efficacy of earlier naval 
blockades in achieving some operational end point with the potential efficacy of 
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blockades today. This portion mostly will discuss how naval tactics have changed 
and the dependence on the open seas of international trade today. Finally, the 
analysis will move from theory to practice, examining two current international 
conflicts for which naval blockades have been discussed as potential solutions.
This succession of analyses accomplishes the following. First, the legality and 
ethics overview provides enough basic knowledge of international law to estab-
lish adequate context for the remainder of the discussion. The key advancement 
of theory then comes in the challenge to conventional thinking about blockades, 
accomplished by dissecting the basic components that affect naval strategy. 
Advancing the enforcement model proposed herein exposes the shortcomings 
in classical thinking; the model redefines how to evaluate blockades and make 
decisions about imposing them. This should contribute to a larger discussion 
about command-and-control strategy and tactics at sea. A primary purpose 
of the article is to build on existing research to improve the classification of 
blockades so as to incorporate them better within the greater context of both 
naval history and modern strategy. Although the enforcement model reevaluates 
some basic approaches to blockades with regard to their purpose, description, 
and application, this analysis is intended to advance the topic into the modern 
era by relabeling prior models and providing strategic examples. Therefore, the 
most important goal of this article is not to complete a discussion but to begin a 
larger examination of naval tactics below the level of armed conflict—that is, to 
rejuvenate the topic of blockades to draw contrasts between old ways of thinking 
and new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Ultimately, this article is intended to 
provide insight on how a classic naval strategy might be understood and applied 
within the context of modern naval operations.
LEGALITY, ETHICS, AND TERMINOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH 
NAVAL BLOCKADES
There are multiple methods of blocking naval access or commercial trade to a re-
gion, but their employment carries significant ramifications in terms of interna-
tional law. The legal issues make definitions critical; which terminology is applied 
is not a mere matter of labeling. The legal restrictions also affect how a blockade 
will be conducted. For purposes of this discussion, the overarching definition 
applied will be as follows: a naval blockade involves blocking access to a region. 
Access encompasses military, trade, and physical aspects; the last mentioned may 
include the ability to perform construction of new or on existing facilities. The 
discussion then addresses how international law restricts different types of ac-
cess, and what that means for naval operations.
Terminology-related confusion surrounds the use of sanctions versus em-
bargoes versus blockades. The difference largely rests in the scope of actions 
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undertaken under each concept. Sanctions involve actions (diplomatic, eco-
nomic, military, or otherwise) that countries take for a variety of reasons, such as 
to condemn particular behaviors or contain an emerging threat.6 However, the 
important point is that the term sanction is construed broadly. An embargo, on 
the other hand, involves the prohibition of trade with a particular group, either 
in part or in totality.7 Thus, embargoes tend to be more severe and encompassing. 
Put another way, all embargoes are sanctions, but not all sanctions are embargoes. 
Colloquial usage of the term sanction, however, tends to confer a more limited 
scope compared with the restrictions involved in an embargo. A blockade is the 
most severe of the three types. This term refers to a belligerent action that one 
nation takes against another to deny access to entire regions (i.e., for purposes 
of this article, sea denial). Blockades typically involve military actions intended 
to keep an enemy from receiving aid.8 All three terms carry legal implications, 
and while the international community largely agrees on the differences among 
these concepts, definitional debate occurs regularly regarding whether particular 
operations are sanctions, embargoes, or blockades.
As important as the distinctions in terminology are, it also is critical to un-
derstand who applies the labels authoritatively. According to the United Nations 
Charter, only the Security Council decides on sanctions and, by extension, the 
even more severe options.9 Article 41 of the Charter reads as follows: “The Secu-
rity Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members 
of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.”10 
These rules essentially grant the Security Council the right to determine what 
course of action is appropriate for a given situation. However, article 41 mostly 
covers sanctions and embargoes; it does not discuss how military forces could be 
employed to enforce the agreed-upon restrictions. Military intervention is better 
addressed by article 42, which extends and clarifies the capabilities of the Security 
Council in these matters. “Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, 
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstra-
tions, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.”11 
These two articles form the primary international law governing the appli-
cation of sanctions, embargoes, and blockades. Unfortunately, owing to their 
brevity they do not delve into details; they were not written to cover the specific 
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parameters of a given scenario. The Security Council largely is left to decide 
which actions will receive international approval and how they will be applied. 
Any actions that the Security Council approves regarding sanctions, embargoes, 
and blockades are legal, by mutual agreement; however, when not all members 
of the Security Council approved the actions in question directly, the details of 
terminology and past practice become more important.
Limited attempts have been made to clarify the intent behind these articles, 
especially with regard to armed conflict at sea. The San Remo Manual on Inter-
national Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea provides the most modern 
international interpretation specifically applying to blockades.12 This volume is 
one of the few comprehensive international instruments drafted in the twentieth 
century that guide determinations of legality regarding naval warfare.13 Although 
it is a legally recognized document, it represents a codification of customary 
international law and therefore is not fully binding. Still, it captures the current 
international consensus regarding blockades.
Perhaps some of the manual’s more important contributions involve the defi-
nition of neutral waters. The manual states that “[n]eutral waters consist of the 
internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable, the archipelagic water, of 
neutral States. Neutral airspace consists of the airspace over neutral waters and 
the land territory of neutral States.”14 These descriptions effectively determine the 
accepted neutral areas during international conflict, but the definitions also set 
up how merchant vessels can be treated during a blockade. The manual states that 
 [m]erchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they:
(a) are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a 
blockade, and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or 
intentionally and clearly resist visit, search, or capture;
(b) engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy;
(c) act as auxiliaries to the enemy’s armed forces;
(d) are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence system;
(e) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or
(f) otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action, e.g., by 
carrying military materials, and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place 
passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit, they are 
to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other precautions.15
The treatment of merchant vessels or others flying the flags of neutral states will 
become particularly important later in this discussion, as it pertains to theoreti-
cal differences among blockade types. The relevant point here is that customary 
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international guidelines do exist regarding target discrimination and legal actions 
against neutral or seemingly neutral vessels during a blockade.
These international laws are important considerations for conducting na-
val operations, including blockades with our allies or against our enemies. In 
addition to customary international law, however, existing U.S. law describes 
accepted procedures for blockades. These instructions are documented in The 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, which directly addresses 
naval blockades.16 Our American definition of a blockade closely matches the 
international guidelines pertaining to military action. “Blockade is a belligerent 
operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neu-
tral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging 
to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.”17 The additional point 
is that our rules are far clearer than the UN Charter articles. Specifically, The 
Commander’s Handbook outlines several criteria to which a valid naval blockade 
must conform.
1. The belligerent nation must establish the blockade, which should be 
accompanied by a declaration that states the beginning date of the 
blockade, the geographical limits, and any grace period allotted for 
neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the restricted area.
2. All nations affected must be notified of the blockade.
3. The blockade must be effective and maintained by legitimate methods 
and means of warfare sufficient to render ingress or egress of the 
blockaded area dangerous.
4. The blockade must be applied with impartiality; any discrimination by 
the belligerent nation in favor of or against the vessels and aircraft of a 
particular nation renders the blockade invalid.
5. The blockade may not block access to or departure from neutral ports and 
coasts.18
These laws and criteria provide basic information regarding our self-imposed 
regulations and some understanding of how they differ in scope and detail from 
international law. Granted, this brief overview does not address a myriad of both 
important and nuanced aspects of naval blockades. For example, our domestic laws 
specifically prohibit imposing a blockade if the sole purpose is to starve the civil-
ian population or deny it anything essential to survival.19 Still, for the purposes of 
legal terminology, the U.S. Navy regards a blockade as belligerent action designed 
to prevent access to a specific region. This definition is in keeping with our guide-
lines that differentiate among terms that include sanction, embargo, and blockade.
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For all the foregoing discussion of legal definitions, it also is important to 
consider the operational implications of terminology—how these terms will be 
defined and used in practice. The critical example here involves sea control, or 
command of the sea.20 In this context, sea control is to be understood in terms 
of the operational concepts formulated with regard to strategy and tactics, 
rather than as a matter of legal definition. The concept encompasses a limited 
or nonpermanent geographical control that allows the controlling naval force 
to exercise the full range of operations within a particular area, including those 
employing undersea elements, surface vessels, aerial assets, and even electronic 
signals.21 The concept of control must extend as well to sea denial; the term refers 
to the ability to prevent adversarial operations within the same temporal and 
geographical space.22 Therefore, sea control encompasses the ability to operate 
unconstrained within a particular environment while simultaneously denying 
operational access to adversarial forces.
The concepts of naval blockades and sea control clearly overlap when discuss-
ing blockade effectiveness, which under our own legal guidelines is a critical 
requirement for maintaining a legal blockade.23 The greatest difficulty comes in 
determining whether a blockading force truly has sea control, involving both 
its own ability to operate without constraints and its ability to deny access to 
adversarial forces. When the engagement involves direct action, it is relatively 
easy to establish whether those conditions exist; however, when sea control is 
estimated largely on the basis of available forces, the determination rests on the 
probability of success of the various strategic courses of action available. The lat-
ter situation requires that any blockade established be such that the international 
legal community will deem it valid and effective even without any martial action. 
Once any active engagement occurs, the circumstances inherently change, and 
related decisions and subsequent actions represent an entirely separate, equally 
complicated discussion.
The point is simply that legal definitions function as mere guidelines when 
they are applied to operational realities in theater. Therefore, while in the context 
in question sea control represents the operational application of the chosen strat-
egy and tactics, in the circumstances of a particular naval blockade it may exist 
in accordance with or in violation of international law. There always will be sig-
nificant gaps between legal definitions and the operational realities of a specific 
set of circumstances, which makes legal determinations subject to interpretation.
In summary, extensive international and domestic instructions exist that lay 
out the operational norms to which naval forces are expected to adhere during 
the conduct of a blockade. For purposes of this discussion, the most important 
point is that all these laws serve only to set the playing field during a time of war. 
Legality presets some rules, which some nations then follow, to varying extents; 
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however, often other parties ignore them entirely. For example, no blockade ever 
has existed without blockade-runners attempting to circumvent it. The laws 
also do not assist in the theoretical matter of incorporating blockades into the 
formulation of naval strategy and tactics or in the practical matter of applying a 
blockade as part of an ongoing naval operation.
These last two points must be addressed formally because, as documented in 
this section, there exists a substantial body of international laws that still govern 
a strategy that was designed during the age of sail. The continued existence of 
these laws seems to imply that blockades remain an effective strategy, which 
raises multiple questions about when and why our naval forces would consider 
using this approach to resolve some conflict today. Therefore, the discussion now 
moves from terminology and legal considerations to the theory and practice of 
conducting naval blockades.
ON THE THEORY AND TYPES OF BLOCKADES
Over the history of naval conflict, the importance of the role that blockading 
strategies have played cannot be overstated. Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested that 
decisive control of the sea required both offensive actions through decisive battles 
and defensive actions through the protection and control of contested waters.24 
Controlling such waterways ostensibly requires at least a partial blockade exer-
cised against hostile forces.
Given the blockade’s historical prominence and effectiveness as a naval strat-
egy, it is important to consider different types of blockades and how they have 
been enacted. Previous descriptions of blockades have divided them roughly 
into three different types, forming part of what we will refer to as the proximity 
model: close blockades, semidistant (or loose) blockades, and distant blockades.25 
Close Blockade
Historically, a close blockade required placing warships within sight of the block-
aded coast or port to ensure the immediate interception of any ship entering or 
leaving the area. Bernard Brodie describes the purpose of a close blockade as ef-
fectively reducing the size of the sea available to the enemy to nothing; or, to put it 
another way, a close blockade effectively makes the enemy’s coast your frontier.26 
The goal is to create a secure perimeter that prevents anything from slipping 
through. Ships’ crews must maintain constant vigilance, and the sheer manpower 
required to execute such a blockade is tied directly to the size of the blockaded 
region. Imposing and maintaining a close blockade of a single port may be a 
reasonable objective; however, conducting a close blockade of an entire coastline 
becomes an increasingly problematic challenge. Succeeding at the latter requires 
a dramatic asymmetry in naval forces, leaving the blockaded nation incapable of 
mustering sufficient operational naval forces to break through.
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A close blockade represents naval strategic thinking and technology devel-
oped during the age of sail. Early in that era blockades generally were ineffective 
or extremely limited because naval forces’ poor seaworthiness and restricted 
range of action prevented them from sustaining operations on a hostile coast.27 
However, by the late sixteenth century the development of much larger and 
more-seaworthy sailing ships enabled sustained naval operations, and by the 
eighteenth century the longer underway time enabled by the coppering of ship 
bottoms made a powerful force such as Britain’s Royal Navy capable of projecting 
and sustaining sufficient naval power to blockade almost any coast in the world.28 
Still, the important practical implications are the advantages and disadvantag-
es of close blockades. The primary benefit of a close blockade is that it effectively 
prevents a smaller force from operating outside its home port at all—superior 
control of the seas carries obvious strategic advantages. Yet other advantages 
also must be considered, such as with regard to relative morale; the blockading 
force feels strong and confident, even if its actions require little to no movement, 
whereas the blockaded force balks at its forced inaction and suffers damage to its 
morale. However, close blockades carry inherent weaknesses too. The approach 
requires manpower proportional to the blockaded area, and maintaining that 
level of effort can be as exhausting for the blockading naval force as for the block-
aded. A tight perimeter is required to ensure that neither vessels of the enemy nor 
blockade-runners of any sort slip through, which means that the blockading force 
must be not only sizable but constantly vigilant. Furthermore, a close blockade 
actually can play to the advantage of the smaller force, if the effort ties the larger 
force to a given area, preventing it from operating elsewhere.29 
Close blockades also epitomize the rationales of the age of sail because their 
effectiveness rested in part on blockading ships’ ability to remain safely out of the 
range of coastal cannon. Since then, the development of and advances in aviation 
have complicated this calculus, as the blockading force must defend itself against 
not only seaborne but airborne forces. This added dimension complicates strate-
gic decision-making and calls into question what a “close” blockade would look 
like if our modern Navy conducted one.
Semidistant or Loose Blockade
A semidistant blockade differs from a close blockade according to the distance 
of the blockading force from the hostile coast; however, the distinction is based 
not on nautical mileage but on intent. A semidistant blockade is aimed at hostile 
naval forces as part of an effort to seek decisive victory through confrontation.30 
These efforts are less suffocating for the blockaded region because the blockad-
ing force cannot, and does not attempt to, deny all access to the region. The less 
secure perimeter permits merchant vessels, and perhaps even limited military 
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reinforcements, access to the blockaded areas. Thus, the blockade function ap-
plies more to enemy naval forces than to any others attempting to access a region.
A semidistant blockade does carry some advantages and disadvantages rela-
tive to a close blockade. For example, the advent, then the expanded use, of mines 
and torpedoes made applying a close blockade much more difficult.31 When 
contending with mines (and we should keep in mind that in the nineteenth cen-
tury so-called torpedoes were actually mines) the blockading force assumed the 
primary operational risk to life. While setting a mine some defenders might lose 
their lives, but a ship navigating a minefield (and its entire crew) risked sinking 
entirely. Granted, mining a port takes time, so enacting this defensive strategy re-
quires making several assumptions and having certain opportunities. Still, defen-
sive mining offered a counterstrategy to the close blockade that required a similar 
counter in blockading strategy. The semidistant blockade was one such counter.
Additionally, a semidistant blockade might be enacted because of a paucity of 
available naval forces. A close blockade required dominant asymmetry in naval 
forces, whereas a semidistant blockade could be enacted even when the blockad-
ing party did not maintain an edge in raw naval power over the adversary. A dis-
advantage comes in the form of allowing some degree of relief for the blockaded 
region, since the focus is on the enemy’s operational forces, not necessarily on 
denying trade access. However, trade likely would suffer reduction as well; the 
degree to which that was so could be measured by the attempted or successful 
running of the semidistant blockade.
Distant Blockade
The third type of blockade in the proximity model is the distant blockade. Similar 
to those of the semidistant variety, these blockades developed as a reaction to 
changes in technology and the corresponding changes in naval strategy. As the 
age of sail gave way to the age of steam, evolutions in naval capability changed the 
demands for fleet resources; consumption of large amounts of fuel changed the 
logistical needs of a fleet. Shifts in the wind no longer provided the same respite 
to either blockading or blockaded forces, and coal-burning ships were limited in 
range compared with sailing ships.32 Combined with the threat of mines, these 
changes in naval technology required shifting why and where naval forces would 
be deployed during a blockade. Expressed differently, a distant blockade can be 
considered a close blockade imposed by a superior class of ship.33 Therefore, in 
a limited sense, a distant blockade became a close blockade, adjusted to the dis-
tances appropriate to the capabilities of more-modern fleets.
Even so, a distant blockade could be seen in a different light if the distance was 
determined for reasons other than technology. For example, a close blockade se-
cures nearly unlimited control over a very small area, whereas a distant blockade 
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secures very limited control over an almost unlimited area. The scope and appli-
cation of sea power are determined by the tools and resources involved. A naval 
force could adopt a distant blockade if it had only limited advantages in resources 
over the opposing naval force; this was so even if it had vastly superior technology 
yet limited resources. In such a situation, a distant blockading force can threaten 
enemy forces with interception and destruction only if the hostile ships venture 
too far from their home ports.34 This approach greatly limits the expenditure of 
resources while still allowing for the establishment of overall naval superiority. 
However, such a blockade would not prevent the hostile force from easily gaining 
access to relief. Therefore, a distant blockade might be seen as a marginal naval 
advantage applied robustly over a great area, rather than as a strategic tool to 
deny access to a particular region. The opportunities a distant blockade opens 
are therefore more abstract than the concrete goals of a close blockade—another 
difference related to intent and opportunity.
These observations are not wholly novel. Corbett differentiated between a 
close blockade designed to deny an enemy the ability even to leave port and 
a distant or observational blockade intended to draw out enemy forces for 
a decisive conflict that would favor the blockading force.35 Put differently, a 
distant blockade would be indistinguishable from open naval warfare against 
an equal opponent over contested waters; what makes it a blockade is the 
advantages—in raw naval forces, technology, or both—enjoyed by the forces 
on one side, and how that naval power employs those forces. For purposes 
of theoretical and legal categorization, the intent behind the choice of block-
ading type becomes an important differentiating factor, in addition to the 
technology extant at the time.
THE PROXIMITY MODEL
These three types of blockades—close, semidistant, and distant—compose what 
we refer to as the proximity model. It is noteworthy that this distinction is ours, 
whereas the language and descriptors are not. However, applying the concept of 
proximity describes changes in both the actual strategy and the intent behind 
the new actions. With regard to the change in strategy, proximity encompasses 
how blockading naval forces adapted naval operations to advances in technology 
by extending the functional operations of a close blockade farther offshore. In 
particular, mines forced blockaders to maintain their close blockades at a greater 
distance from shore, and steam changed the logistical requirements for a fleet 
intending to adopt and maintain a close blockade. Still, the underlying intent 
remained the same—a fleet endeavored to deny all access to a region by estab-
lishing a secure perimeter that prevented anything, even merchant vessels, from 
breaching the cordoned-off area.
11
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A second, and secondary, reason for labeling these ideas the proximity model 
relates to the possibility of permissible passage through the secure border. Spe-
cifically, a close blockade establishes a perimeter intended to be so secure that 
no vessel can breach it; a distant blockade establishes a looser net with a far less 
secure perimeter, and a semidistant blockade falls somewhere between those two 
concepts. In this context, proximity refers to the distance between ships, which re-
flects both the intent of the blockade and the technological capability of the time. 
In this adaptive way the proximity model can address changes in both intent and 
technology while still addressing the key concerns of the scholars who originally 
developed and used this language (specifically Professor Milan N. Vego, whose 
work shaped the development of the proximity model).36 
Granted, maintaining a certain physical proximity between ships along the 
perimeter is only one method of securing the perimeter and denying passage 
through the blockade. Technological advancements allow the security of the cor-
don to be maintained without requiring the physical proximity of ships to be as 
close. Thus, the proximity model truly depends on the degree of security that the 
ships provide over the physical area; proximity therefore becomes a measure of 
the tightness of the security established along the perimeter, by whatever means. 
In the historical context, secure perimeters were established by establishing and 
maintaining a close physical proximity of ships, but the modern context allowed a 
reinterpretation of close, semidistant, and distant purely on the basis of the degree 
to which blockaders could regulate the flow of traffic in and out of the blockaded 
area. This control could be established by employing various forces, including 
airpower as supplied either from aircraft carrier or land, and therefore without 
necessarily requiring a tight net of ships in close physical proximity to each other 
or the shore.
Before we continue, it is worth noting that the proximity model is among the 
most common methods of differentiating blockades, but it is not the only one. 
Another, related method could be referred to as the dimensional model.37 Again, 
the dimensional model label is of our own making, yet it aptly describes the con-
cept. This approach defines a blockade along several dimensions, as follows:
• distance from hostile force: the distance of the perimeter of the blockade, 
whether close or distant, from the blockaded regions
• distance from supply: the variation in practicability of maintaining a blockade 
near home waters versus far from home ports
• permeability: the tightness of the perimeter and the possibility of vessels 
slipping through
• aggression: the level of coercion the blockading force uses, including paper, 
pacific, and belligerent modes38
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The dimensional model provides a highly useful lexicon for categorizing and 
assessing blockading tactics and logistics across a variety of critical dimensions.
THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL
To combine the virtues of the proximity and dimensional models, we propose the 
enforcement model of naval blockades. Whereas the proximity model derives its 
name from the distance of the blockade from the coast or the distances between 
the naval units maintaining the perimeter, and the dimensional model is so la-
beled because it assesses blockades through multiple parameters, the enforcement 
model derives its name from the treatment of blockade-runners. Application of 
the enforcement model still builds on proximity-model and dimensional-model 
tenets by suggesting that the intent and distance of the blockade can have not 
only theoretical significance but practical implications for how a blockade would 
be imposed. The enforcement model is a hybrid of the other two approaches, 
designed to integrate their core premises for both retrospective contemplation 
and prospective practical application.
The enforcement model posits that the best way to evaluate and characterize 
a blockade, whether historically or strategically, is to examine the actions taken 
against individuals who attempt to violate the blockade. It is critical to differen-
tiate categorically between neutral ships and blockade-runners, even if it is not 
always possible for the blockading force to distinguish between them immedi-
ately. Neutral ships may not be attempting to pass through the blockade at all, 
or they may be trying to pass through the perimeter with goods that do not fall 
under sanctions while heading to a port not intentionally cut off by the blockade. 
Despite the many ways in which a ship could be neutral in these scenarios, a key 
characterizing factor is the extent to which a blockading force will investigate 
neutrality to ensure that vessels are not trying to evade the blockade; in the most 
extreme circumstances, the blockading force may not permit any neutral passage 
at all.
Runners provide the opportunity for a particularly interesting assessment of 
the resolve of the blockading force, the potential success of the blockade, and the 
needs of the blockaded region. A more restrictive blockade may have fewer run-
ners, as no one may attempt to impersonate a neutral vessel, and the resolve of the 
blockading force becomes instantly recognizable by whether the force intervenes 
at all, or takes full offensive actions against blockade-runners, or something in 
between. A willingness to intervene forcefully, and to maintain continuously a 
force able to do so, offers insight into what it will take to sustain the blockade. 
Finally, evaluating the activities of blockade-runners also provides insight into 
the blockaded region, because the goods and services most in demand are the 
ones on which smugglers are most likely to concentrate when they endeavor to 
13
Biggs et al.: Theories of Naval Blockades and Their Application in the Twenty-F
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 B I G G S ,  X U,  R OA F,  &  O L S O N  9 1
circumvent the blockade. When we examine blockade categories with regard to 
blockade-runners, a close blockade represents the harshest execution of the con-
cept; in that mode, all blockade-runners—by intent, if not practice—are inter-
cepted and punished, perhaps destroyed. A distant blockade provides the loosest 
net, permitting most blockade-runners to pass by unpunished.
Types of Blockades within the Enforcement Model
The enforcement model involves not categorical differences but rather esca-
lational differences—variations in the responses to blockade-runners. Each 
higher echelon of the model corresponds to a more suffocating blockade, and 
thus to stricter treatment of blockade-runners. The overarching term blockade 
still can be applied to all levels in the model, since the underlying intent remains 
to block or deny access in some way. The four levels of the enforcement model 
are as follows: paper blockades, presence blockades, martial blockades, and total 
blockades.
Paper Blockades. Paper blockades consist of sanctions, embargoes, and other le-
gally condoned barriers to trade and access. The term paper blockade is meant to 
describe not a weak or ineffective blockade but rather one that exists largely in the 
form of a declaration. However, sanctions have only limited effectiveness if there 
is no mechanism to enforce them. This first level also immediately demonstrates 
the underlying importance of considering intent and enforcement in evaluating 
the theoretical and practical significance of naval blockades—namely, sanctions 
describe the outer boundary of blockading actions, yet the sanctions themselves 
are not as important as the actions used to enforce them. If the international com-
munity places sanctions on a country yet no military or law-enforcement entity 
exists to enforce them, the restriction may carry only as far as the paper on which 
it is written. Blockade-runners can throw away the written admonishment and 
continue with their original activities, and enforcement of the blockade itself may 
hamper normal national policing efforts.
However, sanctions supported by military forces—including the actual use of 
those forces—carry significant weight. The sanctions themselves only set out the 
intent to blockade and the terms intended to be imposed. The more revealing 
operational description regarding sanctions comes from the application of naval 
forces, whether in the form of soft power or the use of arms, on any individuals 
who choose to violate the terms of the blockade. The term paper blockade there-
fore describes sanctions or similar prohibitions that declare an intent or issue 
orders to deny access or resources, but lack the mechanisms to enforce that intent 
suitably. Under guidance from The Commander’s Handbook, the United States 
would consider such a blockading tactic not strictly legal, as the lack of an ability 
to enforce the blockade brings its validity into question.39 
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The enforcement model does not attempt to judge the purpose or efficacy of 
sanctions, although it should be noted that there is a large political science litera-
ture specifically dealing with the topic; instead, the primary goal here is to place 
sanctions within the larger context of blockades.
Presence Blockades. Presence blockades mark an increase in the naval forces in-
volved and their collective willingness to enforce the blockade. This approach 
could involve checking cargoes and manifests; establishing a physical presence at 
either embarkation or destination; or sending vessels to patrol contested territory, 
representing a military presence within the blockaded region.
Thus, a variety of methods may denote a presence blockade. The difference 
from a paper blockade is that the blockading force makes its presence felt. Still, 
presence blockades may not address blockade-runners aggressively even if they 
deny some access to the area or some flow of resources. Blockade-runners may be 
permitted to run through the blockade without immediate military intervention.
Martial Blockades. Martial blockades increase the intervention options avail-
able in that blockading forces may intervene immediately with force against any 
blockade-runners. Trade still may flow through the blockade and individuals 
may continue to beat the blockade through the use of false flags, cargo-smuggling 
techniques, or other means, but incorporating immediate military intervention 
dramatically increases the enforcement options available and the consequences 
for attempting to run the blockade. A martial blockade may adhere to interna-
tional legal standards, because this type allows neutral ships to pass. Forceful 
intervention may be permitted only in limited circumstances and against certain 
parties, but it is permitted. Thus, with a martial blockade the intent is to deny not 
all access but only access by a particular party and to a particular region.
In relation to the classifications of the proximity model, martial blockades 
are similar to both semidistant and distant blockades. The blockading force is 
attempting to deny access by using force, yet the lack of a complete presence, 
for whatever reason, prevents the imposition of a suffocating blockade on the 
intended region. Still, even a distant blockade involves the use of force and there-
fore clearly would qualify as a martial blockade.
Total Blockades. Total blockades represent the classic type of blockade, in which 
the blockading force allows no access or passage to anyone else. It involves a com-
plete military shutdown of the region to all parties and anticipates immediate 
action against any and all forces entering the region.
A total blockade therefore would be similar to a close blockade, owing to the 
tightness of the restrictions imposed, although with modern naval technology a 
total blockade could be imposed at quite a distance offshore. This final method is 
the most severe, as it permits no access to the blockaded region. The blockading 
15
Biggs et al.: Theories of Naval Blockades and Their Application in the Twenty-F
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 B I G G S ,  X U,  R OA F,  &  O L S O N  9 3
force will use force aggressively, undeniably, and immediately against anyone at-
tempting entry to the blockaded region.
Comparisons among Models
The ascending levels of the enforcement model represent escalations of force, 
with each higher level carrying forward all the enforcement actions available to 
the blockading force at lower levels. However, escalation does not necessarily 
have to follow a strictly sequential path. A martial blockade could be imposed 
without first imposing a paper blockade and then a presence blockade, but put-
ting in place a martial blockade does not exclude the possibility of imposing legal 
sanctions or merely establishing a physical presence. The key difference becomes 
the totality of the enforcement techniques available to the blockading fleet, which 
must be made known to all at the time of enacting the blockade—a requirement 
under U.S. law.40 
The enforcement model also allows for better practical differentiation among 
blockade types. Sanctions can and likely will be imposed across all the levels 
incorporated in the model; however, the mere imposition of sanctions does 
not determine the naval actions that the blockading force may undertake. The 
enforcement model’s levels can be determined for historical cases by analyzing 
how the blockading fleet acted against blockade-runners. This means that the en-
forcement model can be applied alongside the traditional proximity model when 
considering or evaluating the strategy and tactics used during a blockade. Finally, 
the enforcement model can assist in planning for future blockades, because it in-
herently builds on the stated limitations on the blockading force, thereby keeping 
in line with our required standards of notification.41 
An important comparison involves how the enforcement model differs from 
the dimensional model, especially with regard to terminology. Although the 
dimensional model does include coercion as a possible methodology, it differen-
tiates among paper, pacific, and belligerent blockades. The dimensional model 
would be more likely to interpret a paper blockade as weak or ineffective, given 
the minimal level of force the blockading parties apply. The term pacific blockade 
describes a blockade that is conducted amid general hostilities and includes the 
intent to disturb international trade with the blockaded region.42 While neutral 
parties would be allowed to pass, active hostilities between the blockading and 
blockaded forces is expected. A pacific blockade would fall somewhere between 
the enforcement model’s presence and martial blockades, in that a presence 
blockade applies a physical presence to enforce sanctions or embargoes, while 
a martial blockade involves hostile actions between the opposing parties but no 
attacks on neutral parties. Unfortunately, use of the term pacific blockade does 
not make this differentiation very clear (and it also has nothing to do with a 
blockade occurring in the Pacific Ocean!). Belligerent blockades would involve 
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direct action, although the enforcement model differentiates between a martial 
blockade and a total blockade by defining how far a blockading force will go to 
stop runners, rather than merely including direct action as a possible means of 
pressuring the blockaded force. Thus, practical and theoretical differences in 
terminology separate the dimensional and enforcement models, although con-
sideration of the coercive dimension provides the best comparison between the 
two models.
The enforcement model’s differences from the proximity model in how it 
makes theoretical categorizations of blockade types are not purely matters of 
description or historical classification. The enforcement model better aligns 
with naval blockades as they would be applied in the twenty-first century. This 
assertion requires some defense, including a comparison of the effectiveness of 
blockading tactics in cases from the modern era with those drawn from history. 
The discussion now will turn to the effectiveness of blockades in the twenty-first 
century, both as a practical evaluation of the strategy’s utility today and as a de-
fense of the enforcement model.
PREVIOUS EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKADES  
VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Understanding the effectiveness of a blockade requires first understanding the 
importance of sea power in general, especially with regard to the heavy reliance 
of trade on the sea. In previous centuries the importance of the shipping of goods 
by sea was obvious; today, even if it is less obvious in the global consciousness, 
seaborne shipping remains a critical part of the global economy, notwithstanding 
the development of modern ground-based and aerial methods of transportation. 
The global economy remains highly dependent on maritime shipping—over 90 
percent of the world’s trade involves the sea in some way—so the sea continues 
to be a dominant factor in the global economy.43 This makes control of sea-lanes 
critical to global power even today.
Throughout their evolution, blockades have undergone reinterpretation to 
incorporate new dimensions and adjust to “modern” developments, whenever 
those occurred. Eighteenth-century strategies were adapted largely to the 
sail as the modern technology, then nineteenth-century strategies adapted to 
steam power, and twentieth-century strategies adapted to incorporate aerial 
intervention.
Twenty-first-century technological advancements deal largely with signals, 
making the role of electronic communications the critical area to which blockade 
strategies must adapt. The term signals as used here does not exclude the forms 
of electronic or information warfare that first developed during the twentieth 
century; however, prospective operations now must address the explosion in 
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bandwidth and global connectivity that transformed simple signals and global 
positioning from individually useful tools into critical infrastructure and opera-
tional elements within a modern military. Whereas signals intelligence, when it 
emerged in the twentieth century, was a novel development, in the twenty-first 
century this technological capability may come to dominate military operations. 
Here the terms signals and signals intelligence are construed broadly and applied 
to developments in communications and remote operations that do not require 
physical presence.
Adapting blockades to this evolution is, in many ways, no different from the 
earlier adaptation to an aerial dimension, except that planners must take into ac-
count the effect of denied and degraded environments on the potential success or 
disruption of any blockade. Stopping the flow of information alone could disrupt 
shipping effectively without requiring a full physical force to apply the blockade. 
Ensuring or denying access to information available via remote devices, drones, 
and other communication modes becomes a critical aspect, whether to the abil-
ity to impose a blockade on one side or to exploit a vulnerability so as to break 
through it on the other side. Cyber warfare and signal denial become the primary 
dimensions—at the moment—that the twenty-first century has introduced into 
blockading strategy and tactics, to which a modern warfare concept must adapt 
and which it must attempt to overcome.
Yet even such modern evolutions do not alter the potential influence of sea 
power over the global economy, and people can continue to appreciate the power 
of a blockade that attempts to deny the delivery of resources or other access to an 
area. Historical naval blockades were only as effective as the reliance of an area 
on maritime access, and this principle remains true despite the advancement of 
technology. The greatest change simply has been the introduction of the aerial 
and signal dimensions, which do not fall outside the scope of naval power. An 
aircraft carrier is a tangible and powerful example of how naval and air forces can 
be blended into a nexus of projected power, and cruisers are ideal examples of 
aerial defense and signal denial.
Thus, the potential effectiveness of the blockading strategy remains largely 
unchanged, but the factors that may impact its effectiveness have not necessar-
ily remained the same. While naval blockades remain an important strategy for 
sapping hostile capabilities, the means by which they are made effective have 
evolved.
The next steps in this analysis will involve comparing and contrasting the 
factors impacting a blockade’s success in previous eras versus factors that impact 
blockading success today. With regard to evaluating the effectiveness of a block-
ade, three questions apply. (1) Did/does the blockade achieve the operational 
goal or intended outcome for which it was imposed? (2) Did/does the blockade 
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contribute to the overall strategic success, or were/are extraneous factors respon-
sible for the improvements in the situation? (3) Were/are the costs and resources 
expended worth the ends achieved?44 Our goal here is to provide higher-level 
guidance applicable to a wide array of circumstances, both retrospective and 
prospective, rather than an exhaustive breakdown of past incidents. In the con-
sideration of blockades from previous eras, five factors can be identified as the 
predominant influences on the success or failure of a blockade.
1. Asymmetry of naval strength between the blockading force and the 
opposing force
2. Types of naval forces
3. The willpower to maintain the blockade
4. Suitability of the region for blockade
5. Logistics and resupply
Asymmetry of Naval Strength
The foremost, and perhaps most obvious, factor influencing blockade success is 
asymmetry in naval power between the opposing sides. An effective blockade 
is plausible only in cases in which the blockading power maintains naval forces 
significantly larger than those of the navy being contained. This asymmetry al-
lows the stronger force to contain the lesser force largely by its mere presence, 
or else the defending force would offer some kind of challenge, perhaps even 
coming out and meeting the blockading force in open battle. A superior force 
keeps the smaller force contained and limits the latter’s strategic and tactical 
options.
Asymmetry also dictates the options for the type of blockade. A close blockade 
demands a significant expenditure of resources, which in turn requires having 
more resources to commit. The more closely matched the naval forces, the less 
able one side would be to maintain such a blockade except by tethering a signifi-
cant portion of its total forces to one area and straining its supply lines, all while 
exposing those blockading forces to counterattack.
An important historical example regarding asymmetry of naval forces is the 
Union blockade of the Confederacy during the Civil War. The Union main-
tained the stronger fleet, by far.45 This asymmetry in favor of the Union block-
ading forces had several interesting consequences relevant to any evaluation 
of its success. Some historians note that, despite the asymmetry, the blockade 
was able to maintain only limited effectiveness; for example, blockade-running 
kept the Confederacy supplied with ammunition.46 Therefore asymmetry in 
naval power alone may not determine success, as even significant asymmetry 
overall may be wasted if the blockading force spreads itself too thinly along the 
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blockade perimeter. However, the Union blockade ultimately proved effective 
in other ways; it crippled exports, disrupted regional shipping, and prevented 
importing sufficient goods critical to infrastructure.47 In this sense, even a 
blockade that can stop some but not all blockade-runners still can be effective 
enough at denying or disrupting trade to cripple the blockaded economy. Such 
an outcome requires sustained blockading that is possible only with a substantial 
asymmetry in naval forces.
Other strategic and tactical options become available to a highly superior 
blockading force. For example, a strong blockading force may be able to choose 
which blockade-runners to allow through. Permitting passage of luxury items 
but not critical operational supplies such as ammunition or weapons can cause 
demoralization and discontent within the civilian population.48 A superior force 
also can choose which goods and commodities to blockade against, and other 
aspects of how to execute the blockade. Energy sources could be targeted if the 
nation is not able readily to replenish those losses from internal sources, or the 
blockading force more broadly could alter the economic impact asymmetrically 
by denying only importing or only exporting. The combined point is that a block-
ade can be targeted against specific economic goods or exchanges to create either 
a strategic or a morale asymmetry that the superior force can use to its advantage.
In sum, asymmetry of naval forces has a significant impact on blockade ef-
fectiveness and options for the blockading fleet. Yet asymmetry alone is not suf-
ficient to determine success.
Types of Naval Forces
A factor related to the relative power of naval forces is the types available. The 
Civil War example highlights how the types of forces the Union had available 
for its blockade influenced strategy and tactics on both sides.49 The Confederacy 
could not match the Union in sheer naval strength, but its navy did use mines to 
prevent Union access to Mobile Bay.50 This gave Southern ships a chance to reach 
the port in safety—if they managed to pass through the minefield themselves, 
amid other complexities involved in mine warfare.51 In this case, the smaller fleet 
could not match the larger in building ships, but it could employ a defensive 
strategy that provided an advantage, as its ships knew the safe path through the 
minefield. Against a larger and more powerful fleet that seeks to keep enemy 
forces contained, a smaller fleet still may be able to take action; it is a matter of 
how. The materials to which the smaller fleet has access may determine the basis 
on which it builds its defensive strategy.
This principle applies to the stronger fleet as well in choosing its strategy. Block-
ades only evolved from the close-proximity type into more-advanced versions 
because of ships’ improved technological capabilities. If a fleet could apply copper 
to its ships’ bottoms, it could sustain those ships at sea longer, which enabled it to 
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sustain the blockade longer and at greater distances.52 Thus, the characteristics of 
its fleet can impact significantly the choices available to a blockading power.
This principle extends to modern naval forces, and in intriguing ways. For 
example, an exceptionally powerful fleet may have modern destroyers and air-
craft carriers, but unless it has sufficient numbers of wooden-hulled minesweep-
ers the opposition’s best defense becomes less-advanced ships and well-mined 
passages. Even if two fleets are matched equally in modern destroyers, mining 
remains an important tactic if only one fleet possesses sufficient numbers of 
minesweepers to clear a path.53 This principle regarding fleet composition applies 
likewise if one fleet has more aircraft carriers while the opposing fleet has more 
submarines, or one fleet has more ballistic-missile submarines while the other 
has more fast-attack submarines. The two fleets’ base compositions, including 
both their strengths and weaknesses, enable different blockading strategies and 
become a critical factor determining blockade success. Thus, the types of naval 
forces in a fleet represent another form of asymmetry that, while likely to reflect 
and confirm force-strength disparities, could be used to great advantage by fleets 
maintaining either an offensive or defensive position during a blockade.
Willpower
The third consideration is the willpower to maintain the blockade. A blockade is 
effective only as long as it actually is maintained. In the absence of some decisive 
military action or enemy capitulation, how long is the blockading force willing to 
dedicate the resources necessary to continue the effort? Imposing and maintain-
ing a total blockade on even a tight perimeter require intense motivation, and the 
need therefor would increase significantly if the blockade were applied to an ever-
larger region. The willpower to maintain the blockade must exceed the perceived 
costs of expending whatever resources are necessary to maintain the blockade.
Of course, such costs are relative and depend on one’s perception of the cost-
benefit equation. Although the resources needed to support a blockade may be 
quantifiable, the costs associated with expending those resources on a blockade 
constitute the critical factor, and perceptions of that calculus could be influenced 
by a wide variety of factors. One highly influential factor is the blockade’s per-
ceived value to ongoing operations or national security. The Union blockade 
required the dedication of substantial resources over a period of years, yet the 
determination to maintain the blockade remained largely intact.54 If the Union 
had suffered significant naval losses in other, direct clashes while it was busy 
maintaining the blockade, this might have affected its willpower to maintain the 
blockade; however, in the absence of such losses its willpower remained largely 
undamaged and it was able to continue.
The value of the blockade—or, to look at it from another direction, the value of 
the thing to be blockaded—even might supersede asymmetry as a factor making 
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a blockading force willing to maintain the effort. The American quarantine of 
Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis was predicated on Cold War imperatives 
that made permitting nuclear missiles to reach Cuba unthinkable, so the will-
power to maintain the blockade likely exceeded any consideration regarding 
resource expenditure.55 A more recent example of the significance of willpower 
is the blockade by the Sri Lankan navy (SLN) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE).56 For decades, SLN bases along the northern and eastern coasts of 
Sri Lanka suffered aggressive attacks—swarm, suicide-boat, and amphibious—by 
the highly capable and sophisticated LTTE.57 But in 2006 a new Sri Lankan gov-
ernment came into power whose leadership believed that the only way to defeat 
the LTTE was through the aggressive application of naval force—at any cost. The 
SLN’s approach included the use of intelligence to target LTTE cargo vessels that 
transported arms and supplies; introduction of the “small boat concept,” which 
involved countering the LTTE’s swarm tactics with an overwhelming number of 
small, high-speed, heavily armed patrol craft; the use of land-based radar sites to 
detect and disrupt LTTE activities; and a naval blockade. The blockade was aimed 
at cutting off the LTTE’s seaward escape and supply routes; it focused primarily 
on the LTTE’s headquarters in Jaffna. Although success came with a considerable 
loss of life (military and civilian) and SLN naval vessels, the SLN’s commitment 
to using overwhelming naval force against the LTTE, including maintaining the 
blockade, ultimately enabled the Sri Lankan government to prevail after nearly 
thirty years of civil war.
Essentially, willpower as a factor in determining the strength of a blockade is 
tangential to the asymmetry of naval forces. However, these examples show how 
prominent it can be in determining a blockade’s success.
Suitability of the Region
The fourth factor is the suitability of the region for blockading. This determina-
tion is straightforward, dictated more by geography and navigational factors 
than anything else. Variables include the presence and nature of islands, straits, 
tidal forces, and the like. This factor itself can go a long way toward determining 
whether a blockade will be attempted at all and dictating how one may proceed.
For example, blockading a region that has only one method of ingress and 
egress offers a simple scenario; blockading a small archipelago remains relatively 
simple. But blockading entire island chains, such as those spread across the 
South Pacific, is much more complicated, and thus difficult.
In past eras, geographical factors by themselves could determine whether 
a blockade would be successful. This was especially the case when changing 
winds were likely to provide opportunities for a blockaded fleet to evade the 
blockaders.
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Logistics and Resupply
The sustainability of a blockade rests largely on matters of logistics and resup-
ply. A blockade is not a single decisive naval action but instead depends on the 
ability of the blockading force to maintain its posture over a longer term. The 
dimensional model identifies near and far as two types of blockade, where those 
terms refer to the distance of the theater from the blockading country.58 Greater 
distance complicates the logistics of resupply, making it more difficult to main-
tain the blockade.
Naval technology is a significant factor with regard to logistics. When evalu-
ating the challenges of imposing and maintaining blockades across different 
historical eras, such issues as the pluses and minuses of sail versus steam must 
be considered.
MODERN FACTORS THAT IMPACT BLOCKADE EFFECTIVENESS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Not all previously relevant factors have become irrelevant in modern naval op-
erations; the development of nuclear weapons did not eliminate the use of small 
arms, and the shift to fourth-generation warfare did not eliminate the relevance 
of all tactics used previously.59 Likewise, earlier blockading factors and tactics 
continue to exist, yet their potential influence must be considered in the context 
of conditions that have developed in the modern era. These factors relating to 
blockading, by their advance in parallel with other technological developments, 
changed naval operations as they transitioned from the age of the sail to the age 
of steam. Modern naval operations must incorporate factors that historical naval 
operations did not need to consider in their decision-making processes.
The following five additional factors that could impact the success of naval 
blockades must be addressed.
1. Enforcement rules applied
2. International cooperation
3. Self-sufficiency of the blockaded region
4. Aerial dimension
5. Signal dimension
Analysis of the enforcement rules in use constitutes a direct application of the 
enforcement model, which argues that the effectiveness of the blockade can be 
measured by the treatment of blockade-runners. For example, paper blockades 
could prove largely ineffective if blockade-runners ignore the rules entirely—as 
they most likely will; in contrast, if someone knows that running a blockade car-
ries an imminent risk of attack, that immediate threat provides a deterrent effect 
that contributes to the blockade’s success. In essence, the success of a blockade 
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depends on how effectively the blockade can stop runners, and stopping blockade- 
runners relies on the enforcement rules the blockading force applies.
Another, sometimes underappreciated factor involves international coopera-
tion, especially important given that globalization has led to a more interconnect-
ed world and greater international traffic on the open seas. As one consideration, 
for an international blockade to be strictly legal, the UN Security Council must 
approve it. Another element of international cooperation—or the lack thereof—
involves the other countries in the vicinity of the blockaded region. A blockade is 
going to impact nearby states indirectly even if its scope does not cover their ter-
ritorial waters. Shipping routes will be disrupted and the potential for incidents 
will increase dramatically, whether those incidents arise from misidentification 
of ships or the sheer proximity of operational naval forces. Denial of access to 
neighboring states’ territorial waters also could create problems for the blockad-
ing force by complicating its own sources and lines of resupply. There are myriad 
means of indirect interference by which nearby states, if they choose to exercise 
them, can complicate and limit the blockade. Thus, their consent becomes a sig-
nificant factor in determining the blockade’s success.
A third factor involves the self-sufficiency of the blockaded region. Especially 
in the historical examples, the effectiveness of a naval blockade was influenced 
by the extent to which the region depended on access to ports and shipping by 
sea for goods and supplies. The more self-sufficient the region is, or the more it 
has access to alternative sources of supply by land, the less effective the blockade 
will be. This self-sufficiency also could impact what types of goods or trade a 
blockade can deny most effectively. If the region largely depends on imports for 
a certain commodity, such as oil, then blockading those shipping routes known 
to be used to resupply oil could lead to highly successful presence or martial 
blockades without requiring a total blockade.60 Such strategic decisions have 
significant implications on how a blockade would be enacted, so these factors 
should be considered proactively when determining which enforcement rules to 
apply during the blockade.
An additional aspect of self-sufficiency is the land-based defensive capabilities 
of the blockaded region. Specifically, many evaluations of and projections from 
historical blockades neglect to consider how the aerial dimension might have 
affected those operations, simply because aerial forces had not been invented 
at the time. But modern analysts must consider aerial forces (aircraft and mis-
siles) as a critical factor in evaluating the potential effectiveness of a blockade. 
Essentially, whereas regional self-sufficiency might allow a blockaded region to 
withstand a blockade by surviving the deprivation of resources, aerial offensive 
and defensive elements might allow it to break the blockade and restore the flow 
of goods. These considerations would complicate significantly the challenge of 
blockading an area such as mainland China or the continental United States. 
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/9
 1 0 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Land-based defenses delivered by air provide the blockaded region an effective 
military option to break the blockade and prevent it from achieving its objectives. 
Therefore, for a modern blockade to be effective the aerial dimension must be 
considered, and those forces must be either effectively suppressed or otherwise 
made irrelevant. Aerial factors represented a significant technological advance-
ment of the twentieth century, during which naval operations advanced from the 
last vestiges of the age of sail into the age of steam and then into the age of air, as 
the skies themselves became a significant part of naval operations. Modern forces 
must continue to account for this dimension.
But the twenty-first century has seen yet another evolution in naval forces—
bringing on the age of signal.61 Denying communications and other signals to an 
adversary’s naval operations can be as detrimental to its efforts as the presence 
of a superior naval force in the region. The effectiveness of any modern blockade 
could depend on the signal-disruption capabilities of the adversary. Even supe-
rior fleet forces would not be sufficient to establish sea control over a region if the 
comprehensive sea-denial capabilities of the adversarial force are sufficient—an 
especially relevant consideration with the recent reversion to a focus on great-
power competition.62 Among the components of naval operations, this is the 
aspect most likely to expand its influence during the twenty-first century. Anyone 
considering attempting a blockade in the future will have to evaluate carefully 
the growing role of signal denial as a critical component of military operations.
The five factors discussed here provide a useful framework to be used when 
evaluating or planning a blockade, but their relative relevance and importance 
depend greatly on the specific contexts in which they are applied. Therefore the 
final section will consider two sets of recent events during which the possibility 
of a blockade has been part of the international discussion.
TWO TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY SCENARIOS POSSIBLY  
REQUIRING A NAVAL BLOCKADE
There are at least two ongoing international situations to which naval blockades 
have been discussed as possible solutions: the dispute over the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea, and the efforts to discourage North Korea from pursuing 
its nuclear-weapons program. The discussion that follows does not constitute 
recommendation of a particular course of action, but rather a practical analysis of 
the usefulness of a blockade as a naval strategy to address issues occurring in the 
modern era. The evaluation of these scenarios will touch on many of the factors 
addressed previously concerning the general effectiveness of naval blockades.
The Spratly Islands Dispute
The dispute over the Spratlys concerns a highly contested intersection of waters 
surrounded by many different nations; at its center is an island chain in the South 
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China Sea over which multiple nations—including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam—claim some degree of sovereignty. The 
fact that the islands contain no arable land, have no indigenous inhabitants, and 
offer only a limited supply of drinkable water is insufficient to avoid disputes 
among the regional states; while there are multiple reasons for this competitive 
approach, they largely concern the economic and strategic value of the area.63 
Additionally, American naval vessels’ patrolling of the area to exert the freedom 
of the seas has led to international expressions of concern.
Would a naval blockade of the area be a suitable means of enforcing the inter-
national will? China has expressed interest in militarizing these islands by build-
ing air bases on them, stationing missiles there, or both. Would denying access to 
the islands via blockade prevent the introduction of military assets, and thus the 
islands’ militarization? An evaluation of the possible effectiveness of a blockade 
in this scenario can employ the theories and factors discussed earlier.
Asymmetry is the first consideration. The applicability of this aspect de-
pends on the nations involved in the blockade. For the sake of discussion, let us 
assume that the other parties hold fast and the dispute becomes a matter simply 
between the United States and China. Current American naval power provides 
sufficient forces to enact a blockade anywhere in the world. Other factors then 
determine whether such a blockade would last a day or a decade. Foremost, 
the willpower to maintain the blockade would have to be strong. The Spratly 
Islands are an archipelago in the middle of open seas, so geographically the area 
is not well suited to a blockade, and they are more than an ocean away from our 
home ports, so the logistics of resupply would be complicated. According to the 
classical factors relevant to blockades, therefore, imposing and maintaining a 
blockade of the Spratly Islands would be impractical.
Then more-modern factors must be considered. The self-sufficiency of the 
blockaded region is irrelevant because no one lives on the islands; however, if 
China decided to keep a permanent military presence there, its self-sufficiency 
would be near zero, as the installation would run out of fresh water in days. In 
the latter scenario, a blockade could be highly effective, with the personnel on 
the islands forced to abandon them.
International support, especially in these contested waters, is another im-
portant consideration. Our presumption for the sake of argument was that 
other nations hold fast, but it would be foolish to assume that dozens of nations 
would take no action of any kind. With so many nations involved, the logistical 
hurdles would become impossible to navigate if even half the interested parties 
decided to act indirectly to make the blockade more challenging.
Whether this blockade would be successful, then, would come down to the 
rules enforced, which likely would determine and drive the course of action. Open 
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warfare between the United States and China over uninhabited islands is unlikely, 
which means that the blockade employed likely would be of either the paper or 
the presence type; blockade-runners could ignore either approach easily unless a 
party intervened with force. Thus, a blockade of the Spratly Islands likely would be 
a protracted and complicated endeavor that could be made effective only during a 
full-scale war—which emphasizes the futility of the suggestion, as in such a case the 
Spratly Islands would be reduced to an afterthought.
North Korea
The second scenario involves a blockade of North Korea as a means of forcing a 
cessation of its nuclear-weapons program. This would be an extreme step—an at-
tempt to use a naval blockade to enforce international sanctions that North Korea 
actively has attempted to circumvent for years.64 The asymmetry of naval forces 
is unquestionable, measured on any dimension. American willpower to stop the 
North Korean nuclear threat would be resolute. The geography makes the region 
suitable for blockade, in that North Korea has only two coasts, consisting of 1,550 
miles of coastline. Logistics and resupply could be issues, although the burden 
would be reduced greatly because the United States operates multiple naval bases 
in Japan, in North Korea’s immediate vicinity.
Considering the longtime alliances between the United States and South Ko-
rea and the United States and Japan, international cooperation likely would favor 
the United States. However, Russia and China share a significant land border with 
North Korea, and the influences they might exert are also critical to consider. If 
the Russians and Chinese were willing to supply North Korea via this land border, 
a naval blockade would prove wholly ineffective—“blockade-runners” simply 
would have found another avenue left open to them by the rules of the enforced 
blockade.
As with the Spratly Islands scenario, the enforcement rules become a critical 
concern. Those rules would depend on international cooperation, the willpower 
of the blockading force, and asymmetry in naval power, among other factors. 
In this sense, the enforcement rules are not just a theoretical classification but a 
summary consideration leading to the final course of action. Imposing and main-
taining a total blockade, including an aerial blockade to stop resupply via the land 
border, would require war, possibly with multiple nations.
Both the Spratly Islands and North Korea scenarios present a complex array of 
factors, a complete evaluation of which is beyond the scope of this paper. How-
ever, the decision whether to employ a naval blockade should be made by assess-
ing seven key factors: asymmetry, willpower, suitability, logistics, international 
cooperation, self-sufficiency, and enforcement rules. Ultimately, the key factor is 
enforcement of the blockade, especially with regard to how blockade-runners are 
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treated. Despite favorable assessment across the other factors, without the ability 
to enforce the blockade, it is unlikely to be successful.
BLOCKADES: FROM FARRAGUT TO THE FUTURE
Dr. Vego has written, “The successful conduct of naval warfare depends on one’s 
ability to obtain and maintain or deny control of a part of the maritime theater.”65 
This article has revisited the blockade as a naval strategy that exists at a lower 
hierarchical level than armed conflict, but that may evolve into armed conflict. 
Despite the blockade’s prominent use throughout naval history, there has been 
little evaluation of how it would apply in the modern era. It is especially impor-
tant to consider whether the differences between historical cases and modern 
scenarios can highlight changes over time that would expose shortcomings in 
current naval strategy.
Although this article has addressed numerous topics, ranging from legality to 
the development of the enforcement model, and has provided practical compari-
sons, just as notable are the many topics not addressed in sufficient depth. For 
example, the evolving roles of airpower and signals intelligence represent compli-
cated topics warranting more in-depth examination. Likewise, additional efforts 
should examine the importance of domestic support for making naval blockades 
successful; the potential for electronic banking to sap the effectiveness of physical 
blockades; and, in contrast, the support that electronic banking could lend to the 
application of sanctions, making them more than mere paper blockades.66 
Ultimately, the naval blockade continues to be a relevant part of modern naval 
strategy, but conducting one is a complicated endeavor. While much has changed 
since the days of sailing ships, the underlying principles of naval blockades re-
main as important today as they were to Admiral David G. Farragut during the 
Civil War. However, too many evaluations of naval blockades rely on specific and 
historical examples to determine the relevant factors, which limits their value 
to those conducting naval decision-making today. In short, if blockades are to 
be considered an important aspect of naval operations, we need to develop and 
employ theories that enable the practical application of blockades today, not just 
their historical consideration.
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